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This essay is about the ongoing anti-immigration campaign against Romanians and 
Bulgarians in the United Kingdom. Its aim is to examine the campaign’s central discourses, 
arguments and internal logics, as well as their connection and departure from earlier 
discourses of ethnic and racial exclusion in the UK. While anxiety about Bulgarians and 
Romanians is not fully separated from Britain’s experience with other ethnic minorities, it is 
also the case that East Europeans are subject to different cultural representations than people 
of South Asian, Middle Eastern, African or Caribbean origin. As a result, the campaign 
against Bulgarians and Romanians is based upon new lines of racist argumentation, which, 
due to their novelty, evade the censorship of commonly-accepted social regulations about 
what language can and cannot be legitimately used when discussing race, ethnicity and 
immigration. This has enabled neo-racist and xenophobic ideas about Bulgarians and 
Romanians to circulate freely in the media with little successful resistance or opposition. In 
this essay I argue that there are three lines of anti-immigration discourse. These are based on 
(1) cultural stereotypes of East European criminality, (2) the difference in the economic 
prosperity of Britain and Eastern Europe, and (3) a fear that immigrants, particularly those 
of Roma origin, will disrupt the cohesion of British community life. I address these anti-
immigration discourses by offering an assessment of their consistencies and inconsistencies, 
as well the ways in which they propagate xenophobic ideas and racist stereotypes through 
apparently non-racist and ethnically neutral language. 
 
 
Introduction to the anti-immigration movement 
 
Bulgaria and Romania gained accession to the European Union in 2007, giving their citizens 
the right to travel and live anywhere within the union without a visa. The United Kingdom, 
however, along with a number of other European countries,1 imposed temporary restrictions 
on the working rights of Bulgarians and Romanians and maintained a policy of work 
permits. These restrictions, according to EU law, could only remain in place for a maximum 
of seven years, and so on January 1, 2014, they were lifted. 
The full opening of the British labour market to Bulgarians and Romanians has led to a 
media frenzy, a widespread concern about an influx of migrants, and a rather unfortunate 
rhetoric of exclusion targeting these two countries. Among those most alarmed are factions 
of the governing Conservative Party, and the Eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP) and its supporters. UKIP, to be sure, prides itself on being the only political 
party that genuinely intends to stop immigration, and it constantly accuses the Conservatives 
of not doing enough about the immigration problem. The anti-immigration and anti-EU 
rhetoric of UKIP is indeed phrased with more aggressive language and proposes harsher 
measures than that of the Conservatives, but I would argue that insofar as internal logic and 
proposed reasons for border control are concerned, the two parties are very similar if not 
identical on their stance towards immigration. For instance, in response to the 2014 lifting of 
 working restrictions, David Cameron has suggested that “free movement within Europe 
needs to be less free,”2 while Nigel Farage, the leader of UKIP and a member of the 
European Parliament, has called for an overall five-year ban on permit-free immigration for 
Bulgarians and Romanians.3 One right-wing tabloid supported by UKIP, The Daily Express, 
has even invited its readers to join “a crusade” to “stop new EU migrants flooding into 
Britain” by signing a petition against the lifting of working restrictions for Bulgarians and 
Romanians.4 
This anti-immigration talk and its Eurosceptic underpinnings have provoked a sharp 
reaction from Brussels. In particular, Viviane Reding, the vice-president of the European 
Commission, has accused British politicians of populism and misleading the public:  
 
This supposed invasion of foreigners coming to the UK and stealing the jobs and stealing the 
social security and the health money. The fact and figures, and we all know this, show it is 
simply not true [...]. What is leadership if you just try with populistic movements and 
populistic speech to gain votes? You are destroying the future of your people.5 
 
Yet, the British public seems to be just as concerned as its political leaders about open 
borders and the arrival of new immigrants: recent polls have predicted that UKIP will 
outperform both Labour and the Conservative Party in the upcoming European election of 
May 2014,6 and one major think tank study on British social attitudes has reported that 
seventy-seven per cent of respondents want a reduction in immigration to the UK.7 The UK 
is thus facing significant Euroscepticism and anxiety about immigration, and this may well 
put its future membership of the EU at stake.  
 
 
Unification, fragmentation and the multiculturalism backlash: the 
context of European racism 
 
The anti-Bulgarian and Romanian campaign is not an isolated incident of ethnic, racial or 
religious exclusion in Europe, but part of a much larger pattern in which European 
expansion coexists with fragmentation and nationalist sectarianism. As Rosi Braidotti 
observes:  
 
the expansion of European boundaries coincides with the resurgence of micronationalist 
borders at all levels in Europe today. Unification coexists with the closing down of borders; 
the common European citizenship and the common currency coexist with increasing internal 
fragmentation and regionalism; a new allegedly postnationalist identity coexists with the return 
of xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism.8 
 
At the heart of the matter of xenophobia and nationalist resurgence lies the problem of how 
people represent themselves, others, and the differences between themselves and others as 
ethnic and national subjects. These representations are often multiple and contradictory, and 
they involve existential riddles and questions about who one is and how she or he ought to 
treat others. In Britain, as in many other countries, such questions are mediated by the fact 
that xenophobia and racism carry negative connotations, and few people would consciously 
identify with racism or want to live in a racist community. Furthermore, border control and 
exclusion of immigrants can be seen by people as a matter of sustainability and management 
of resources and populations, and not a matter of stereotyping, racializing, and exerting 
violence upon others. From an analytical perspective, the idea that the two sides can be 
separated from one another is questionable, but so is the idea that all anxieties over 
immigration can be reduced to racist motivations and practices. This makes nationalist 
 exclusion in Britain complex and ambiguous: on the one hand, neither exclusionary political 
discourses and policies, nor people’s representations of themselves and others can be 
reduced to the simple categories of racist or non-racist, xenophobic or non-xenophobic; on 
the other hand, violent racism and xenophobia may indeed lurk underneath apparently non-
racist discourses, and use the latter as just another tool for reproducing racial and ethnic 
hierarchies and marginalizing minorities. 
This ambiguity is a prominent feature of contemporary western racism, and also of the 
so-called “multiculturalism backlash.”9 As a number of authors observe, the dominant 
discourse of racial and ethnic exclusion in Western Europe is no longer based on notions of 
“race” and “racial” hierarchy as it was in the 1960s and early 1970s, but rather on the idea of 
cultural attachment and insurmountable cultural incompatibilities.10 Difference between 
groups is imagined as difference in the cultural practices, traditions and beliefs that each 
group holds and is persistently attached to. The problem of difference, according to this 
discourse, is not that one group is inferior or superior to another, but rather that the cultures 
of minorities are at odds with that of the majority. Racial and ethnic exclusion is thus based 
on a fear that immigrants or minorities will not integrate, and will consequently fragment the 
national community. Etienne Balibar makes this point succinctly: 
 
Ideologically, current racism […] fits into a framework of “racism without races” […]. It is a 
racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural 
differences, a racism which, at first sight does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or 
people in relation to others but “only” the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the 
incompatibility of life-styles and traditions: in short it is […] a differentialist racism.11  
 
This way of imagining racial or ethnic difference also underpins the recent scepticism 
towards multiculturalism in Britain and elsewhere in Europe. In Britain, especially since the 
London bombings of 7/7, there has been much anxiety about home-grown Islam, Islamic 
“faith schools,” and the supposed failure of Muslims to integrate into mainstream culture 
even when they were born and raised in the UK.12 Multiculturalism is thus often perceived 
as a failed policy, which has stimulated ethnic insularity and religious sectarianism that 
clashes with British liberal values. 
As Ralph Grillo has shown, however, what the British white majority fears is not cultural 
diversity in itself but an over-identification with cultural difference, which spills over into 
public life. Grillo cites a BBC/MORI poll according to which sixty-two per cent of those 
surveyed agreed that multiculturalism “makes the country a better place” (despite the 
increasing scepticism towards it), while fifty-eight per cent thought that “people who come 
to live in Britain should adopt the values of and traditions of British culture.”13 This data 
suggests that many Britons indeed value ethnic and cultural diversity but only insofar as it 
does not entail incompatibility between minorities and “British culture.” Critics of 
multiculturalism tend to hold the same view, but what is specific about many of them is the 
way they conceive of the term. Multiculturalism, as Grillo argues, is an ambiguous concept 
that can either have a “strong” or a “weak” variation: “strong multiculturalism” refers to 
“institutional recognition for difference in the public sphere, with special provisions in 
language, education, health care, welfare, etcetera, and the organization of representation on 
ethnic/cultural lines”14; “weak multiculturalism,” in contrast, is about “cultural difference 
recognized […] in the private sphere, with acculturation in many areas of life and 
assimilation to the local population in employment, housing, education, health care and 
welfare.”15 The problem is that while in practice multiculturalism is usually “weak,” its 
critics often perceive it as “strong.”16 The backlash against multiculturalism thus follows the 
same logic as the “cultural racism” or “differentialist racism” that Balibar and others write 
about: it is based on the fear that migrants will fragment British cultural life in the public 
 sphere and disrupt the cohesion of the British community as a result of their incompatible 
cultures, values and beliefs. 
This view is fundamentally different from that of classical racism, and as the data shows, 
it is not necessarily incompatible with genuine appreciation for cultural difference and 
“weak multiculturalism.” I would go as far as to argue that many people who hold the views 
of differentialist racism would themselves abhor classical racism and its logic of biological 
hierarchy. The danger here, however, is that this abhorrence—as genuine as it may be—
might act as an anti-racist disguise that conceals new racist forms of exclusion. This 
obfuscation, furthermore, is not only a matter of how people relate to others, but also a 
matter of how they relate to themselves and whether they recognize their own racism. 
 
 
From cultural difference to economic disparity: delinquency and 
poverty in Eastern Europe 
 
What, then, are the discourses of the current campaign against Bulgarians and Romanians 
and where do they fit within this dominant ideological framework? The fear of community 
fragmentation which is central to “differentialist racism” forms only one aspect of a complex 
and multi-layered set of stereotypes and representations about culture, economy and 
community. In fact, as I show in the next section, Nigel Farage, the leader of UKIP, seems 
to use it as a kind of fail-safe—as an argument that is evoked when the favoured argument 
about the economy is no longer persuasive. 
In the 2000s the common stereotypes of Romania and Bulgaria were based on a culture 
of corruption and scams (including a counterfeit UK visa scam in 2004 that led to the 
resignation of the British immigration minister), as well as a substantially large, 
disenchanted and impoverished Roma community that often resorts to begging and petty 
theft as a means of subsistence. As one study from 2009 puts it: 
 
It would seem that public perceptions about Bulgarians and Romanians […] revolve around 
criminality and corruption, but also the large Roma populations of Romania and Bulgaria. As 
in the rest of Europe, Roma are the subject of much prejudice in the UK […]. The visa 
scandals [of 2004] also confirmed in many people’s minds that there would be large numbers 
of immigrants “trying to beat the system”. Some of the perceptions were apparently confirmed 
in a leaked Home Office document of July 2006 that warned of “45, 000 undesirable” criminal 
migrants expected to arrive in the UK from Romania and Bulgaria after accession.17  
 
The fear of East European criminality has no doubt persisted in the immigration debate to 
this day. Hence, Nigel Farage has recently spoken of “a Romanian crime epidemic” in 
London;18 Gerard Batten, a UKIP member of the European Parliament, has complained that 
the EU has given Britain “criminals, drug addicts, alcoholics, beggars, vagrants and benefit 
seekers”;19 David Cameron has pre-emptively declared that “if people […] are begging or 
sleeping rough—they will be removed”;20 and The Daily Mail has even (allegedly) exposed 
a Bulgarian consultancy that counterfeits documents for Bulgarians to claim benefits in the 
UK.21 My contention, however, is that despite its continued presence this language has 
largely given way to a new discourse, which focuses less on crime and scams per se, and 
more on the economic causes and consequences of immigration. In this way, the focus is no 
longer on the cultural stereotyping of Bulgarians and Romanians as vagrants, fraudsters and 
criminals—although the persistent salience of these stereotypes underpins the whole 
discourse and should not be underestimated—but rather on the more ethnically and 
culturally neutral language of economic circumstances and income disparity. 
 Today, it is emphasized over and over that Bulgaria and Romania are the poorest 
member states of the EU, with the implication that migration to Britain is an economically 
rational thing to do for anyone from a less wealthy country. David Cameron has stated, 
correctly in my opinion, that “vast population movements [are] caused by huge disparities in 
income,”22 while Nigel Farage has spoken, in somewhat more harsh and populist terms, 
about “total, uncontrolled immigration from twenty-nine million poor people in Romania 
and Bulgaria,”23 and declared in a Channel Four documentary that “if I was a Bulgarian, I’d 
be packing my bags now, wanting to come to Britain.”24 From there, it is assumed that if the 
driving factors behind immigration are primarily economic, then so are the consequences 
that the UK will suffer once the newcomers arrive, and so are the reasons for which 
immigration must be stopped. 
Three specific concerns can be pinpointed as particularly pronounced within the 
discourse on the economy. The first is simply that the current institutions and infrastructure 
are not fit to absorb further population growth. In Nigel Farage’s words, 
 
[a]s a small country we simply cannot accommodate the hundreds of thousands who may look 
to Britain as an opportunity for a more comfortable life. The result will be so much pressure on 
public services, employment, housing and education that the quality of living in the UK drops 
for all.25  
 
Or yet again:  
 
We have rising youth unemployment, overcrowding in schools and hospitals. We simply 
cannot afford to have thousands more people coming to live in the UK in January [2014] while 
we are still trying to patch up our fragile economy.26  
 
The second concern is the much-discussed “benefit tourism” in which migrants allegedly 
arrive in the UK for the sole purpose of claiming social security benefits at the expense of 
the British taxpayer. There is a widespread anxiety that according to EU law Bulgarians and 
Romanians can come to the UK without any intention of working or contributing to the 
economy, and have entitlement to the same housing and unemployment benefits as British 
citizens. This issue has been widely discussed in British politics and media, and it has even 
prompted the Prime Minister to explicitly denounce “benefit tourism” and implement policy 
changes that make it more difficult for immigrants to claim benefits.27 This discourse on 
“benefit tourism” has a double logic that needs to be emphasized here. On the one hand, the 
concept is underpinned by the above-mentioned stereotype of East European fraudulent and 
unethical behaviour. On the other hand, it is also treated as an economically rational practice 
that would naturally draw migrants to the UK. Farage makes this last point implicitly in his 
Channel Four documentary when he interviews a wife and husband living in Sofia’s Roma 
ghetto. When the woman complains that she has no job, rummages through rubbish bins to 
survive, and faces abuse on a regular basis, Farage answers as follows: “but from next year, 
if you wanted to, you could move to London where the British government will give you 
somewhere to live that’s heated, and a chance of work, and you’d be […] financially a lot 
better off. Do you think that would be attractive to people living here [in the Roma 
ghetto]?”28 This is no doubt a rhetorical question intended to highlight the inevitability of 
immigration as a result of poverty in Bulgaria, and the consequences of British open border 
policy. Thus, when the Roma man tries to retain some dignity in the face of Farage’s 
patronizing question and answers in the negative, the scene conveys a second point, namely 
that Bulgarians’ claims about not wanting to immigrate to the UK defy common sense and 
are most likely false. 
 The third economic concern about immigration is that Bulgarians and Romanians will 
take jobs that would otherwise go to young British people. This is a problem related to the 
economy and economic well-being, but also to the social cohesion of communities (see 
below). As one 2013 news article on UKIP’s website presents the problem: 
 
UKIP remains very concerned about the rise in youth unemployment. Youth unemployment 
has increased by another 15,000 to 973,000. With the prospect of Romania and Bulgaria 
having the free movement of people next year, UKIP believes that the only way to truly tackle 
youth unemployment and get our young people back to work is by limiting the number of 
migrant workers coming in from Eastern Europe.29 
 
Here, once again, David Cameron is aligned with UKIP when he says that “[y]ou cannot 
blame people for wanting to come here and work hard; but the real answer lies in training 
our own people to fill these jobs.”30 The point, as I understand it, is that while Bulgarian and 
Romanian migrants may have good intentions about working hard and being good citizens, 
they still pose a problem because they marginalize British workers from the labour market 
and contribute to their unemployment. 
What is striking about the “benefit tourism” and youth unemployment arguments is that 
when combined together they form a foolproof attack against immigration and deny the very 
possibility that immigrants could contribute to the British economy. If Bulgarians and 
Romanians come to Britain without the intention to work—i.e., if they come to exploit the 
benefits system—then they are detrimental to the economy and they are not wanted; if, 
however, they do come with the intention to work, then they are taking jobs away from 
British youth and are once again detrimental, if not to the British economy, then at least to 
the economic well-being of British young people. Whether immigrants come to work, or 
whether they come to not work, their presence will have a negative impact all the same. This 
rationale is far more exclusionary than the earlier discourses of criminality because it 
encompasses and targets all Bulgarians and Romanians, regardless of their profession, 
character or intent. It is also far more culturally and ethnically neutral (despite the insulting 
assumption that Bulgarians and Romanians are “benefit seekers”) because it attempts to 
pose the issue in terms of real, statistically verifiable economic differences between Britain 
and Eastern Europe, without making claims to cultural superiority or moral values. The issue 
here is not that Bulgarians and Romanians are disliked—saying that would be overtly racist 
and thus socially unacceptable—but rather that their arrival in large numbers cannot be 
accommodated. 
 
 
From economy to social cohesion: the problem of the Roma 
 
One wonders to what extent the anxiety provoked by Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants is 
really about economic issues as opposed to something else that is perhaps only expressed 
and disguised as an economic concern. The reason I say this is because there is substantial 
evidence that immigrants from East European countries have made a positive economic 
impact since 2000, and have paid more taxes and used less benefits than British citizens. The 
positive contribution of East European immigration has been emphasized by high-ranking 
state officials and publicized by the media,31 but it has not quelled public fears about 
immigration, and certainly has not convinced right-wingers like Farage. In fact, when 
confronted with this evidence, Farage has responded by deferring the problem from the 
domain of the economy to the domain of social cohesion, adding yet another layer to the 
cultural and economic reasons for closing the borders. Here is how he did this in an 
interview on BBC Radio Four: 
  
If you said to me, would you want to see over the next ten years a further five million people 
coming to Britain, and if that happened, we would all be slightly richer, I would say “actually, 
you know what, I’d rather we weren’t slightly richer, and I’d rather we had communities that 
felt more united, and I’d rather have a situation where young, unemployed British people had a 
realistic chance of getting a job.” So yes, I do think that the social side of this matters more 
than pure market economics.32  
 
It is somewhat unclear where these five million people will come from (perhaps over a 
quarter of the twenty-nine million Romanians and Bulgarians that he talks about have plans 
to immigrate to Britain), but the general point is easy enough to grasp: foreigners remain 
foreign (as opposed to becoming British), they take the jobs of local youth, and they divide 
communities. In another interview, Farage makes this point even more explicitly, while 
simultaneously paying lip service to British “multiracial society”: 
 
A multiracial society can be harmonious, successful, and in most parts of this country, it is. 
What I’m afraid we’ve had in the last few years are very large numbers of people coming to 
Britain who don’t even speak English. When you have that situation, there’s no chance of 
integration happening within our towns and cities and we finish up with a more divided 
society.33 
 
Here, we arrive at the logic of “cultural racism” where too much cultural difference and too 
many immigrants become a threat to community cohesiveness, despite the potential 
economic benefits. This shift in focus from economy to community coincides with a shift 
from Bulgarians and Romanians to East European Roma gypsies as the main threat.  
The integrity and cohesion of British communities is seen as specifically threatened by 
the East European Roma. This has been highlighted by the Labour MP David Blunkett34 and 
the Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg35 in relation to a specific case in Sheffield, where 
Roma immigrants from Slovakia have allegedly caused trouble in the community. The 
Roma, according to local residents, are an isolated group showing no sign of integrating into 
British life; they are loud and disturb the neighbourhood during late hours, they are always 
out on the streets, and they do not practice proper waste disposal. The tensions between the 
Roma and local residents are apparently so severe that Blunkett, the MP for Sheffield 
Brightside and Hillsborough, has gone as far as warning that the Roma may cause new race 
riots in the UK.36 This fear of the Roma, of course, has consequences for Bulgaria and 
Romania because they have substantial Roma populations that could potentially move to the 
UK and cause similar trouble in other cities. Thus, the problem is that while immigration 
may bring an overall economic benefit, one aspect of it—the threat of the Roma—can have 
disastrous consequences for communities across Britain. In this discourse, the Roma are 
singled out as the most dangerous group of all the “twenty-nine million poor people in 
Bulgaria and Romania”: they are stereotyped as anti-social and with little regard for the 
rules of the communities they move to; they are at the very bottom of the economic ladder; 
and they are even seen as potential initiators of riots. 
There is an implicit slippage in this discourse from the exclusion of the particular Roma 
community to the exclusion of Bulgarians and Romanians as a whole. The fact that “the 
dropping of border controls for Bulgarians and Romanians […] has […] sparked a public 
outcry about the potential influx of Roma gypsies,”37 is closely tied to arguments against the 
lifting of working restrictions in 2014. Because of this, fear of the Roma and fear of 
loosening border controls for Bulgarians and Romanians are often conflated. This slippage 
takes place in conjunction with the shift described earlier from an economic argument to a 
social cohesion argument, and it completely nullifies the fact that immigration from Eastern 
 Europe is advantageous. The implicit line of reasoning is as follows: Bulgarian and 
Romanian immigration as a whole may be economically beneficial, but a part of it—Roma 
immigration—is socially (as well as economically and culturally) detrimental; consequently, 
Bulgarian and Romanian immigration as a whole is detrimental and this is why the UK 
should keep its borders shut. Singling out the Roma in this way, and proposing anti-
immigration policies against two entire countries on the grounds of their large Roma 
populations, is extremely dangerous for at least two reasons: first, this alienates and 
marginalizes the Roma even further; and second, it will likely make the ethnic majority in 
Bulgaria and Romania feel excluded from Europe on account of the Roma, leading to even 
stronger anti-Roma sentiments in these countries. 
Nigel Farage has tried to preventively clear himself from potential charges of alienating 
the Roma by shifting the blame to Bulgarians and Romanians, and emphasizing the Roma’s 
exclusion from mainstream society in these two countries. In an interview on “the Roma 
threat” posted on his personal blog, Farage claims to sympathize with the Roma’s social and 
economic conditions and the persecution they suffer in Eastern Europe.38 Yet, when the 
interviewer asks whether this is not sufficient reason to try to help the Roma as opposed to 
excluding them even further, Farage—clearly caught by surprise—declares that Britain has 
enough problems as it is: 
 
Farage: I have visited their communities, they are singled out, they are treated about as well as 
the Jews were in the mid-1930s in Germany. Let’s be frank: these are the circumstances these 
people are living in in Romania and Bulgaria. If you don't believe me, go and see it, it’s 
unbelievable. But… 
 
Interviewer: Isn’t that a very good case then for taking them? 
 
Farage: How many? Half a million? A million? Two million? Three million? I mean what are 
you suggesting? 
 
Interviewer: I mean a very similar debate was had about the Jews in the 1930s. 
 
Farage: Well, but they are not—yeah—they are excluded from society, I don't think because 
they are excluded from society, they count as refugees. They’re not actually gonna be perse—
you know they’re not—they’re not actually being killed, they’re just being treated very badly 
in their own communities. And whilst I feel sorry for them because I’ve been there and met 
them, I think the message that has to come from this country is we’ve got enough social 
problems of our own, without taking on any more. 
 
This astonishing exchange is indicative of the way in which Farage perceives the difference 
and relationship between the British on the one hand, and Bulgarians, Romanians and Roma, 
on the other hand. Beneath the layers of cultural, economic and social argumentation, there 
is a gulf between the two sides that more or less forecloses any form of empathy or ethical 
commitment towards either the Roma minority or the Bulgarian and Romanian ethnic 
majority. This is where Farage’s racism comes the closest to exposing itself as such—as the 
absolute refusal to identify with the other, to put himself in the other’s shoes, or to show 
genuine concern without implicating negative stereotypes. With respect to the Roma, Farage 
claims to “feel sorry for them” because they are marginalized in all imaginable ways, but he 
expresses no willingness whatsoever to improve their condition because, in his words, 
“they're not actually being killed.” With respect to the ethnic majority in Bulgaria and 
Romania, Farage evokes a rather callous double standard: when Bulgarians and Romanians 
marginalize the Roma, they are compared to German Nazis in the 1930s; yet when Farage 
marginalizes the same people, it is because Britain has enough problems as it is. Evidently, 
 it does not occur to him that maybe the “poor people in Romania and Bulgaria” turn their 
backs on an isolated, impoverished, and anti-social Roma community for the same reason as 
he turns his own back on it—because they have “enough […] problems of [their] own, 
without taking on any more”? Had this occurred to Farage, and had he been genuinely 
concerned about the Roma’s condition, he might have approached the issue differently and 
tried to work with both the Roma and the ethnic majority in Romania and Bulgaria, as 
opposed to shutting the doors to both and portraying them as lesser human beings. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This essay argues that the anti-immigration campaign against Bulgarians and Romanians is 
based on three main logics of exclusion, revolving around (1) cultural stereotypes of 
criminality, (2) the economic disparity between the UK and Eastern Europe, and (3) British 
social cohesion and the threat of community fragmentation. These logics can converge upon 
one another to form complex and multi-layered representations of immigrants (the 
fraudulent and poor “benefit seeker,” the impoverished Roma who disrupts community life), 
and they can also act as fail-safes for one another (e.g., when immigration proves 
economically beneficial and the focus is shifted to the problem of social cohesion). As 
someone reluctant to reduce all immigration anxiety to racism, I think we ought to be 
cautious when dispensing accusations of racism against politicians and people who want to 
see immigration reduced. Yet, I also think that the contradictions, slippages, and deferrals of 
the anti-immigration discourses discussed here should alert us that the apparently neutral 
languages of economic sustainability or community cohesion often conceal xenophobia, 
ethical indifference, and a stubborn refusal to give up one’s fear of otherness. 
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